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Abstract 
 
 Chimpanzees provide help to unrelated individuals in a broad range of situations. 
The pattern of helping within pairs suggests that contingent reciprocity may have been an 
important mechanism in the evolution of altruism in chimpanzees. However, correlational 
analyses of the cumulative pattern of interactions over time do not demonstrate that 
helping is contingent upon previous acts of altruism, as required by the theory of 
reciprocal altruism. Experimental studies provide a controlled approach to examine the 
importance of contingency in helping interactions. In this study, we evaluated whether 
chimpanzees would be more likely to provide food to a social partner from their home 
group if their partner had previously provided food for them. The chimpanzees 
manipulated a barpull apparatus in which actors could deliver rewards either to 
themselves and their partners or only to themselves. Our findings indicate that the 
chimpanzees’ responses were not consistently influenced by the behavior of their partners 
in previous rounds. Only one of the 11 dyads that we tested demonstrated positive 
reciprocity. We conclude that contingent reciprocity does not spontaneously arise in 
experimental settings, despite the fact patterns of behavior in the field indicate that 
individuals cooperate preferentially with reciprocating partners.  
 
Key words:  Chimpanzee, Pan troglodytes, reciprocity, prosocial behavior, other-
regarding behavior
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Introduction 
 
Both kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) and contingent reciprocity (Axelrod, 1981; 
Trivers, 1971) may contribute to the evolution of altruism. While there is good evidence 
for kin biases in various forms of altruistic behavior across the animal kingdom 
(Dugatkin, 1997), there is considerable controversy regarding the role of contingent 
reciprocity in sustaining altruism (Hammerstein, 2003; Silk, 2008). In order to 
demonstrate that contingent reciprocity is operating, it is necessary to show that the 
likelihood of providing help at one point of time is contingent on past interactions. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, to meet this burden of proof in naturalistic studies (but see 
Gomes et al., 2008). This has led researchers to develop experimental protocols for 
studying reciprocity in a variety of species (Saguinus oedipus: Hauser et al., 2003; 
Gasterosteus aculeatus: Milinski, 1987; Cyanocitta cristata: Stephens et al., 2002; Rattus 
norvegicus: Rutte and Taborsky, 2007; 2008). Carefully designed experimental studies 
allow researchers to quantify pay offs, regulate opportunities for turn-taking, and monitor 
the sequence of interactions across time. Several experimental studies have demonstrated 
the presence of contingent reciprocity (Rutte and Taborsky, 2008; Hauser et al., 2003), 
and there is some evidence for contingent grooming (Gomes et al., 2008) and cooperation 
(De Waal 1997; Melis et al., 2008) in chimpanzees. Here, we examine whether the 
opportunity for turn-taking in an experimental task increases the frequency of helpful 
(prosocial) behavior within familiar pairs of unrelated chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes.  In 
this experiment, chimpanzees had the opportunity to provide one reward to themselves 
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and an identical reward to their partner (prosocial option), or to provide one reward to 
themselves and nothing to their partner (selfish option). Previous work indicated that 
chimpanzees do not discriminate between these two options when there is no opportunity 
for turn-taking (Jensen et al.. 2006; Silk et al.. 2005; Vonk et al.. 2008). We predicted 
that the opportunity for turn-taking would enhance the probability of choosing the 
prosocial option, and that chimpanzees would be sensitive to the behavior of their 
partners in previous rounds.  
Chimpanzees are likely candidates for the development of contingent behavioral 
strategies because they meet the cognitive conditions which have been proposed as 
necessary. Stevens and Hauser (2004) argue that, aside from the prerequisites outlined by 
Trivers (1971; recipient benefit > donor cost, repeated interaction, cheater detection), 
there are three additional cognitive requirements for the development of contingency, 
namely the ability to overcome temporal discounting biases, the capacity for numerical 
discrimination, and the capacity for learning and memory.  Experimental evidence 
indicates that chimpanzees meet these requirements (temporal discounting: Beran and 
Evans, 2006; numerical discrimination: Hanus and Call, 2007; memory/learning: 
Matsuzawa, 2001).   
In the wild, chimpanzees perform a variety of cooperative behaviors with 
unrelated partners, and the patterning of their interactions is consistent with predictions of 
the theory of reciprocal altruism. Male chimpanzees jointly patrol their territories, hunt 
collectively, share meat, groom one another, form coalitions in aggressive intragroup 
encounters, and cooperate in mate guarding (Goodall, 1986; Muller and Mitani, 2005; 
Gomes et al., 2008). While males show clear preferences for maternal kin (Langergraber 
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et al., 2007), cooperation is also extended to unrelated males. In some populations, males 
more frequently provide these kinds of services to those individuals who are most likely 
to provide them with services in return (Duffy et al., 2007; Mitani et al., 2000; Watts, 
1998, 2002). Nonetheless, the observational data are correlational in nature and so do not 
demonstrate that cooperation is contingent on previous interactions.  Thus, the role of 
contingent reciprocity in shaping these interactions remains unclear.  
 Limited experimental evidence suggests that contingent reciprocity may play 
some role in the patterning of food sharing in chimpanzees. For example, de Waal (1997) 
found that chimpanzees who gained possession of a bundle of leafy branches were more 
tolerant of transfers to individuals who had groomed them earlier in the day than they 
were of individuals who had not groomed them earlier. However, the absolute magnitude 
of this effect was relatively small, and grooming had more pronounced effects on food 
transfers among pairs of chimpanzees that did not frequently groom one another than 
among frequent grooming partners. While these data suggest that immediate 
contingencies may influence behavior in some circumstances, such contingencies may 
not be the only factor shaping tolerant responses in chimpanzees in this context.  More 
recent studies indicate that chimpanzees show a weak tendency to help those who have 
previously helped them, as compared to control trials, but subjects did not assist this 
helpful individual more than another chimpanzee who had failed to help them (Melis et 
al., 2008).  In another study, chimpanzees were capable of contingent reciprocity in a 
restricted paradigm, but not when the behavior must arise spontaneously (Yamamoto & 
Tanaka, in press).  Finally, a recent study of wild chimpanzees indicates that 
reciprocation of grooming is more common over long, than short, time periods, and that 
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this pattern cannot be explained by mutual grooming events or kinship (Gomes et al., 
2008).   
We examined the potential for contingent reciprocity in captive chimpanzees in a 
simple barpull task. We chose the barpull apparatus for two reasons. First, these 
chimpanzees had completed two previous experiments using the same device, and were 
familiar with how it worked (Silk et al.., 2005; Vonk et al.., 2008). In addition, we would 
be able to directly compare our results across studies. Similar types of barpull devices 
have been used successfully with chimpanzees (Crawford, 1937; Melis et al., 2006a, 
2006b), capuchins (Brosnan et al., 2006; de Waal and Berger, 2000; Mendres and de 
Waal, 2000), and callithrichids (Cronin et al., 2005; Cronin and Snowdon, 2008; 
Burkhart et al., 2008), suggesting that the device is appropriate for a range of nonhuman 
primates. Finally, we chose a payoff structure that rewarded the actor as well as the 
recipient, to increase the likelihood of prosocial (if not altruistic) acts. 
In this experiment, individuals were tested in pairs. In each trial, one member of 
the pair could choose between two options: (1) deliver a food reward to itself and nothing 
to its partner (the selfish option, hereafter) or (2) deliver identical food rewards to itself 
and its partner (prosocial option). On the next trial, the partner was offered the same set 
of choices; this procedure was alternated across 16 trials per session (giving each 
chimpanzee eight possible pulls). Based on previous experiments using the same 
apparatus and the same set of options (Silk et al.., 2005), we predicted that the 
chimpanzees would choose the prosocial option about half of the time on the first trial 
within each session. If chimpanzees are sensitive to the behavior of their partners (which 
they are when interacting with humans; Subiyal et al., in press), then they are expected to 
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preferentially choose the prosocial option when their partner had chosen the prosocial 
option on previous rounds and to preferentially chose the selfish option if their partner 
had not chosen the prosocial option on previous trials. If chimpanzees are insensitive to 
contingency in this context, then they will be unaffected by their partners’ choice in 
previous trials.  
Methods 
Subjects 
Chimpanzee subjects were drawn from six corral-housed groups at the Michale E. 
Keeling Center for Comparative Medicine and Research of the UT M. D. Anderson 
Cancer Center in Bastrop, Texas. Each of these multi-male, multi-female groups of 7 to 
15 individuals have been maintained as stable social units for up to 30 years. All groups 
have approximately the same age distribution among adults, although the number of 
immatures varies by group. These groups are housed in large outdoor enclosures with 
climbing structures and other forms of enrichment (Riddle et al., 1982), and also have 
access to an indoor area. They have ad libitum access to primate chow and water and 
receive at least four additional enrichment meals spread throughout the day.  
Here we report the results of experiments involving 13 adult females who formed 
11 different dyads. All animals were paired with members of their own social groups. 
When one chimpanzee was paired with more than one partner (range: 1-3 partners per 
subject), all testing with one partner was completed before testing with another partner 
was initiated. Ten of these chimpanzees had been involved in two previous studies using 
the same apparatus (Silk et al.., 2005; Vonk et al.., 2008). Six of these chimpanzees had 
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played the role of actor in previous experiments, and thus had had the opportunity to 
manipulate the apparatus, bringing rewards to themselves and/or their partners. Four had 
been potential recipients in previous experiments. These individuals had not had the 
opportunity to manipulate the barpull apparatus, but had watched other chimpanzees use 
the apparatus and had received food rewards from the apparatus.  
Experimental Setup  
 Chimpanzees were tested in indoor sections of their home enclosure. The 
chimpanzees were positioned in adjacent enclosures, divided by a wire mesh fence. They 
were able to see each other, vocalize, and do limited grooming through this mesh barrier. 
The experimental apparatus was a two-tiered barpull apparatus (Figure 1). One individual 
(the ‘actor’) could use this apparatus to choose one of two options (described below). In 
the next trial, the apparatus was adjusted so that the chimpanzee on the other side (the 
‘recipient’) had an opportunity to operate the barpull for the next trial. The chimpanzees 
did not switch sides between trials within a session or between sessions. Below, we refer 
to the individual who was able to dispense food rewards on the current trial as the actor, 
and to the other individual as the recipient.  
The barpull apparatus, consisting of two trays stacked vertically, spanned most of 
the width of the adjoining enclosures in which subjects were tested. The two trays, made 
of clear Lexan (plastic), were approximately 45 cm apart. Each tray had a colored metal 
sweeper mounted on the tray with tracks. Each sweeper had a rope handle (in the same 
color as the bar) attached to it on both sides. The ropes could be pulled back so that they 
were available on only one side; in this way we were able to alternate chimpanzees’ 
ability to manipulate the barpull between trials. When one of these ropes was pulled, the 
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sweeper that the rope was attached to moved along the tracks toward the chimpanzees. 
These two sweepers were connected with a mechanical apparatus so that when one 
sweeper was pulled forward, the other sweeper locked and the rope handle retracted 
several inches so that the chimpanzee could not reach it. Food placed on the Lexan tray in 
front of the sweeper was swept close to the edge of the enclosures when the handle was 
pulled, allowing the chimpanzees to obtain rewards.  
Food rewards were chosen to maximize motivation of the subjects to attend to the 
study.  Rewards for both subject and partner consisted of small, “bite sized” chocolate, 
caramel and peanut candies that were approximately 16 cubic cm in volume.  These 
rewards are highly preferred by all subjects and are never received in the typical diet.  
Subjects who had not been exposed to the barpull before were trained using the 
same series of training conditions that had been used in earlier studies. Training was 
designed to ensure that subjects understood that they could choose one of the two levels 
in each trial, without biasing them towards pulling one level over the other. In order to 
facilitate understanding of how the apparatus worked, chimpanzees viewed partners 
receiving rewards as a byproduct of their actions to obtain their own rewards during 
training, but were never encouraged to choose a particular option (1/1 or 1/0) or to choose 
the option which rewarded the partner.   
Training sessions consisted of 20 60-second trials in which experimenter baited 
the trays (top first), then moved the apparatus within reach of the chimpanzees.  The 
experimenter then left the room for the duration of the trial. If the actor pulled a handle 
within five trials, trials continued until the end of the session, or until the actor did not 
pull a handle for five consecutive trials. In this case, the next trial was a “demonstration” 
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trial, in which the experimenter simultaneously pushed both sweepers all the way forward 
after baiting the tray. After the “demonstration” trial, there were five additional “delayed 
demonstration” trials in which the actor was given 30 seconds to pull a handle (while the 
experimenter was out of the room) before the experimenter pushed both trays forward.  If 
at any point the actor pulled without prompting, unprompted trials began again.  If this 
did not occur within five delayed demonstration trials, the actor was given two 90-second 
unprompted trials before resuming delayed demonstration trials, unless this would be the 
last pull of a session, in which case delayed demonstration trials continued.  Unprompted 
trials served to keep the actor from just learning to wait for the experimenter to push the 
sweepers forward on each trial.  Criterion required the actor to pull in eight of the last ten 
trials in a session without prompting.  If the actor did not reach criterion within five 
sessions, that individual was not included in the experiment (Silk et al., 2005 and Vonk et 
al., 2008).  All subjects repeated the training regardless of previous experience, to verify 
that they were still willing to utilize the apparatus. 
Testing  
Testing consisted of six 16-trial sessions per pair. Because subjects alternated 
roles, each chimpanzee controlled the apparatus for 8 of these trials in each session (48 
trials total). For each of these sessions, one subject played the role of actor in all odd 
trials and the other subject played the role of actor in all even trials; whether the 
chimpanzee pulled on odd or even trials alternated between sessions and it was randomly 
determined which subject pulled first in the first session. Trays were baited so that one 
tray had two identical rewards, the 1/1 option (e.g. one reward for the actor and one for 
the recipient) and one tray, the 1/0 option, had only one reward, for the actor. Thus, the 
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actor always received the same reward, regardless of her choice, but she could choose to 
reward her partner as well. All three rewards were identical, so the actor’s choice did not 
affect the amount of food she received. The rewards were counterbalanced between top 
and bottom for each actor (so each actor had 4 trials per session in which the 1/1 option 
was on top and 4 trials per session in which 1/1 option was on the bottom). The order was 
determined randomly, except that no actor had more than three trials in a row that were 
baited in the same way. Trials in which the actor made no response were not re-run. 
For each trial, the experimenter held up the rewards to be placed on the top tray, 
calling both subjects by name (to verify that they saw the rewards), then placed these 
rewards on the tray. If the option included two rewards, both rewards were placed 
simultaneously, one in each hand. This was then repeated for the bottom tray. After both 
trays were baited, the apparatus was pushed forward approximately 15 cm so that it could 
be accessed by the actor. Immediately after this, the experimenter left the room for 45 
seconds to reduce the possibility that the experimenter was influencing behavior. A video 
camera recorded all trials. When the experimenter re-entered the room, she pulled back 
the apparatus, removed any rewards from the apparatus, switched the sides of the rope 
handles (so that the other chimpanzee could now pull) and began timing the next trial. 
Approximately 2 minutes separated each trial. 
Each pair participated in only one session per day, and no pair was tested more 
than five times per week (typically pairs received 2-3 sessions per week). No subject 
participated in more than one pairing at a time. Testing sessions were conducted across a 
twelve-month period. All trials were videotaped using a Canon digital video camera.  
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Control Condition 
After the completion of testing, each subject also completed a control to verify 
that they understood that the food that they could not reach was available to their partner 
on the other side of the partition. We did not run this test earlier in the experiment to 
avoid biasing the chimpanzees to pull the option which rewarded their partner, and to 
avoid possible confusion which could arise if they could reach food in the other enclosure 
during some trials or sessions, but not others. 
For this, subjects were tested individually for 16 trials in a single session. The 
door between the two compartments was left open, allowing the subject full access to 
both sides of the testing area. Each tray was baited so that one food item (the same bite-
sized candy bar) was placed on one level of one side of the barpull apparatus, and the 
ropes to pull in the trays were available on the other side. Thus, in order to get food, the 
subject had to pull the tray in on one side and then cross to the other side to obtain the 
food. This methodology was chosen to avoid presenting the chimpanzees with too many 
candy bars in a single session (a prohibition based on husbandry and veterinary 
concerns).   The side on which the subject pulled (and food was available) alternated 
between trials within the session, so that the subject was able to pull on each side eight 
times. This was done to replicate the method used during the regular test.  
If subjects understood the way that the apparatus worked, they were expected to 
pull in the tray and then walk through the door to obtain their reward from the other side. 
Only seven subjects were available for this control test, but all seven obtained rewards 
from the other side in at least one trial. Consistent with their behavior in the experimental 
trials, subjects pulled on 64% of all control trials. Subjects obtained rewards on 58% of 
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trials in which they made a response (range: 100% to 50%). One subject obtained 
rewards on every trial. For the six remaining subjects, subjects showed a strong 
preference for choosing their preferred level (upper/lower), even though it did not 
provide rewards. This was the source of all errors for four subjects; 71% of the errors for 
one subject; and 60% of the errors for another subject.  All but one of these subjects 
overcame their bias at least once and obtained rewards by choosing their less preferred 
level.  
Data Coding  
The experimenter (M.C.M.) coded the data during testing. One rater who did not 
participate in the experiment also coded 20% of the trials from videotape independently. 
The rater coded which handle the chimpanzee chose to pull. The rater agreed about which 
handle the actor pulled on 205 of 215 trials, yielding a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.93.  
We did not code the behavior of recipients during testing because the video 
footage did not provide a good view of the chimpanzees behavior inside the enclosures. 
There were no lights inside the dens (to protect the chimpanzees), the walls of the dens 
were painted grey, and the front of the dens was barred, so the footage of the interior 
portions of the dens was poor. The video cameras were set up to provide a clear image of 
the barpull apparatus, which was positioned outside the dens in a well lit area.  
Furthermore, to avoid biasing subjects, the experimenter left the room during testing, so 
live coding was not possible.   
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Data Analysis  
We used two complementary methods to analyze these data. First, in aggregate 
analyses, we calculated a series of conditional probabilities to compare the likelihood of a 
subject pulling the prosocial option on a trial given that her partner pulled the prosocial  
option or the selfish option on previous trials. Second, to analyze whether the actor’s 
behavior was influenced by the previous behavior of her partner, we used a logistic 
regression model using clustered robust standard errors to deal with the non-
independence of repeated observations from the same dyad. The actor’s choice (prosocial 
or selfish) was the dependent variable. The independent variables included the outcome 
in previous trials in which the partner pulled (prosocial, selfish, no response), trial 
number (1-16), session number (1-6), and position of the prosocial option (upper or 
lower). Because the actors might have attended to their partners’ behavior across multiple 
trials, we examined the effect of behavior (a) in the previous trial, (b) the previous two 
trials, and (c) the previous three trials, as has been done in previous studies (e.g. Chen 
and Hauser, 2005). In addition, because of the dependencies in the data due to individuals 
participating in multiple dyads, we examined the effect of behavior on the previous 
trial(s) for each dyad in separate regressions.  
In some trials, actors made no response. In the analyses reported below, we 
treated these trials the same as selfish responses because in both cases the actor did not 
deliver a food reward to the recipient. To make sure that this decision did not influence 
the results, we also conducted multinomial regression analyses in which all three choices 
(prosocial, selfish, and no response) by actors and partners on previous trials were 
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categorized separately. None of the results reported below were substantially altered (see 
Table 2b).  
 
Results 
 
Subjects’ behavior was largely unaffected by their partners’ behavior in previous 
trials. There are four possible sequences of outcomes across a pair of successive trials: 
prosocial/prosocial, prosocial/selfish, selfish/prosocial, selfish/selfish. If the chimpanzees 
deployed contingent behavioral strategies, the prosocial/prosocial and selfish/selfish 
sequences should predominate. Figure 1a (see also Table 2a) shows that actors were just 
as likely to choose the prosocial option given that their partner had chosen the selfish 
option or had made no response in the previous round (45%) as they were to choose the 
prosocial option given that their partner had also chosen the prosocial option (44%). 
Similarly, the likelihood of choosing the selfish option or making no response was not 
influenced by what their partner had done in the previous trial. Analyses based on 
behavior across the previous two trials and the previous three trials provide very similar 
results (Figure1b,c; see also Table 1a-c).  
The logistic regression analyses confirm that the chimpanzees did not respond to 
the behavior of their partners in previous trials in a consistent way (Table 3a-c). We 
examined the effects of trial number, baiting position, partners’ past choice(s), and 
session number on the likelihood of choosing the prosocial option. The odds ratio (e.g. 
the odds of a given choice based on the partner’s previous choices) for partners past 
choice(s) on Tables 3a, 3b and 3c are always close to 1 and never distinguishable from 
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zero. In fact, the odds ratios indicate that the chimpanzees were much more strongly 
affected by the position of the prosocial option (upper/lower) than by whether their 
partners had chosen the prosocial option in previous trial(s). There was no significant 
effect of session or trial on the chimpanzees’ responses, indicating that the chimpanzees 
did not become more responsive to their partner’s behavior as the experiment progressed 
(Figure 3).  
We also conducted separate logistic regression analyses for each dyad. The 
likelihood of choosing the prosocial option was not significantly affected by the behavior 
of the partner in the previous round for any of the dyads. The p-values on the odds ratio 
for partner’s previous choice was always greater than 0.19 for all 11 runs. However, 
when we considered behavior in the previous two trials, evidence of contingency 
emerged for one dyad, and when we included behavior in the previous three trials one 
additional dyad showed evidence of contingency. In one dyad, the females were more 
likely to choose the prosocial option as the number of prosocial choices by their partners 
in previous rounds increased; in the other dyad, the pattern was reversed. Note that a p-
value of 0.05 indicates that for every 20 tests, one Type I (false positive) error is expected 
to occur by chance. Thus, with 33 tests, approximately 1.7 significant results are expected 
to arise by chance. 
 
Discussion 
The chimpanzees that we tested did not respond to the behavior of their partners 
in a contingent manner. As a group, they were no more likely to choose the prosocial 
option if their partner had chosen the prosocial option in the previous trial than if their 
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partner had chosen the selfish option or done nothing. The results obtained from the 
aggregate data generally correspond to the results of analyses on individual pairs.  We 
found evidence of contingent responses in two of the 13 dyads that we tested; in one pair, 
prosocial choices in the previous two rounds increased the chance of prosocial choices in 
the current round, but in the other pair of females, prosocial choices in the last three 
rounds decreased the likelihood of prosocial choices in the current round.  The 
opportunity for turn-taking in this experiment did not elevate the likelihood of choosing 
the prosocial option over the level observed in previous experiments in which roles of 
actor and recipient did not alternate. In the present experiment, actors who made a 
response chose the prosocial option 52% of the time (95% CI  48% to 56%; n = 905 trials 
in 11 independent dyads), which is not distinguishable from the level observed in a 
previous study in which the chimpanzees did not alternate roles (49%; 95% CI  45% to 
5%; n = 554 trials in 11 independent dyads; Silk et al.. 2005). Moreover, in the present 
study there was no effect of trial or session. This indicates that the chimpanzees did not 
develop contingent strategies over the course of the experiment.  
The absence of contingent responses in this experiment is notable because it 
would have provided a mechanism for individuals to increase the likelihood of obtaining 
rare and highly valued rewards for themselves. If individuals rewarded their partners for 
prosocial choices by making prosocial choices themselves, they might have been able to 
shape their partners’ behavior and increase the number of rewards that they obtained 
themselves in the course of the experiment. Moreover, their motivation to adopt this 
strategy would not have competed with selfish preferences because actors incurred no 
costs when they chose the prosocial option instead of the selfish option.  
Brosnan et al.                  page 18 
These results are striking because chimpanzees show considerable cognitive 
complexity (Matsuzawa, 2001), exhibit strong preferences for cooperating with particular 
partners in the wild (Muller and Mitani, 2005), seem to be able to keep track of 
exchanges across currencies (in the sense of scorekeeping: de Waal 1997a, Duffy et al., 
2007; Mitani et al., 2000; Watts, 1998, 2002), and successfully collaborate on mutualistic 
tasks in the laboratory (Melis et al., 2006a, 2006b; Crawford, 1937, although see 
Tomasello and Call, 1997).  However, our results are compatible with recent work which 
suggests that contingent reciprocity is not a robust force in experimental settings.  Melis 
and colleagues (2008) found that chimpanzees show slightly increased levels of helping 
behavior towards individuals who helped them in the past, but their willingness to assist 
cooperative partners did not differ from their willingness to assist uncooperative partners.  
Taken together, these studies suggest that chimpanzees, despite their cognitive 
sophistication, do not adopt contingent reciprocal strategies in these controlled 
experimental settings.  Below we explore some possibilities for why this is the case. 
One conclusion that could be drawn from these studies is that chimpanzees are 
not capable of deploying contingent reciprocal strategies, and other mechanisms underlie 
exchange in natural settings. Some of the possible alternative mechanisms would include 
attitudinal reciprocity (de Waal 2000) or biological market models (Noë and 
Hammerstein, 1995; Noë et al., 2001; Barrett et al., 1999; de Waal, 1997). Those who are 
skeptical of the evidence for reciprocity in nature are likely to favor this possibility. 
However, those who believe that the correlational evidence is suggestive of contingent 
reciprocity are likely to think that the experiments failed to elicit the kind of behavioral 
Brosnan et al.                  page 19 
strategies that chimpanzees deploy in the wild. Below we discuss some of the possible 
reasons that experimental studies may fail to elicit contingent reciprocity.  
As with any experiment, elements of the task may have affected the chimpanzees’ 
performance (Noë, 2006). The chimpanzees that we tested were not able to choose their 
own partners and could not control the timing of their interactions, as they can in more 
naturalistic settings.  If  relationship quality influences the propensity for contingent 
reciprocity, then restrictions on partner choice may have influenced the results that we 
obtained. However, de Waal (1997) found stronger evidence of contingency among 
individuals that did not groom often than frequent grooming partners, which suggests that 
strong bonds are not a prerequisite for the development of contingent altruism in 
chimpanzees.  It is also possible that contingent reciprocity operates over a longer time 
frame than experimental studies consider.  For example, Gomes and her colleagues 
(2008) found that grooming was more evenly balanced over the course of a week than 
within days or within single bouts.  Thus, it is possible that partner’s behavior during a 
single experimental trial has less impact on the actor’s behavior than the many social 
interactions that they have had in the past.  
The lack of contingency observed in experimental settings might also be related to 
the fact that chimpanzees and other primates do not keep precise track of favors given 
and received. De Waal (2000) has proposed that reciprocity may be maintained by 
’attitudinal reciprocity,’ in which individuals’ responses are based on  the positive 
feelings generated when a partner gives a favor, not on an exact accounting of favors 
given and received. Recent studies suggest that the hormone oxytocin may provide a 
proximate mechanism that regulates such feelings. In humans, oxytocin increases trust 
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and generosity in experimental settings, even when subjects interact with strangers 
(Kosfeld et al., 2005).  In nonhuman primates, oxytocin is released during grooming 
(Morhenn et al., in press).  One drawback to this potential mechanism is that it may be 
possible for individuals to benefit by shirking unless there is some mechanism that 
translates costs and benefits in to feelings or affect (Silk, 2005). 
Chimpanzees may not develop contingent strategies in this task because their 
evolved psychology for altruism does not extend to food. Although chimpanzees are well 
known for permitting meat transfers in the wild (Mitani and Watts, 2001; Nishida et al., 
1992) and mothers sometimes allow their infants access to food scraps that they possess 
(Nishida and Taylor, 1996; Silk, 1979), there is some dispute about whether food 
exchanges among adults are better characterized as tolerated theft (e.g. Gilby, 2006) or 
voluntary sharing (Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, 1990; Mitani, 2006). Recent studies of food 
transfers between mothers and infants suggest that mothers are reluctant to give up 
preferred food items, and do not often initiate food transfers to their infants (Ueno and 
Matsuzawa, 2004). This has led Warneken and his colleagues (2007) to suggest that the 
use of food rewards in experimental studies like this one may obscure the propensity for 
helpful behavior because chimpanzees treat all interactions involving food as part of a 
zero-sum game. If this is the case, then self-interested preferences may overwhelm other 
motivations, including other-regarding preferences, when food rewards are salient 
(Warneken et al., 2007).  
It also is possible that chimpanzees (and other primates) might practice reciprocal 
altruism in the wild, but do not display contingent responses in experimental settings 
because they do not have a domain-general capacity for contingent reciprocity. 
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Chimpanzees in the wild do selectively exchange meat with the same individuals that 
they hunt with, groom, and support in agonistic interactions (Mitani, 2006), which 
suggests that wild chimpanzees may trade goods (food) for services in their exchange 
economy. . The chimpanzees that we tested may not have consistently chosen the 
prosocial option after their partner chose the prosocial option (and vice versa) because 
they did not associate the task that they were confronted with in these experiments with 
the kinds of situations that elicit contingent reciprocal responses in more natural 
circumstances. This could explain why our results differ from the results obtained in 
more naturalistic controlled studies of contingent reciprocity in vervets (Seyfarth and 
Cheney, 1984), macaques (Hemelrijk, 1994), and chimpanzees (de Waal, 1997). 
However, capuchins (de Waal and Berger, 2000) and tamarins (Hauser et al.., 2003) have 
been tested with devices very similar to the device used in this study, and produced more 
convincing evidence for contingent reciprocity than we observed in this study.  
Much of the evidence for exchanges in the wild is based on services, such as 
grooming and support, rather than goods, such as food. Service exchanges and service 
economies may be more likely to develop than those involving goods because service 
economies avoid the issues of property, risk, and ownership inherent in goods (Brosnan 
et al.. 2008). While it is possible for food items to be acquired and quickly exchanged, or 
consumed immediately and stored as valuable fat on the recipient’s body, the full benefit 
of exchanging goods requires extra-bodily storage, which risks theft, loss, or degradation. 
Services, on the other hand, do not require storage and typically cannot be taken by force. 
Beyond kin-based transfers (e.g., milk to offspring), it seems plausible that what evolved 
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first was the capacity or motivation to exchange services, followed by interchange of 
goods for services and, ultimately, goods for goods (Brosnan et al.. 2008).   
The findings presented here suggest that contingent reciprocity does not 
spontaneously arise in experimental settings, even when it would seem to be an 
advantageous strategy for individuals to adopt. Although chimpanzees seem to 
cooperative preferentially with reciprocating partners in the wild, the mechanisms 
underlying their exchanges remain uncertain. The apparent discontinuity between the 
patterning of altruistic behavior within dyads in the field and in the laboratory requires 
further investigation. More systematic efforts to document contingent behavioral 
strategies in naturalistic settings and more creative efforts to simulate ecologically-
relevant opportunities for contingent cooperation in the laboratory may help to resolve 
this paradox and shed light on the mechanisms that favor the evolution of cooperation in 
apes and other primates.     
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: A schematic of the barpull apparatus.  One lexan tray were positioned on top of 
the other, with a vertical separation of  approximately 18 inches.  The actor could choose 
to pull, using a rope handle (thick dotted lines) either of the two barpulls (gray bars) 
forward to receive food (black circles). The recipient only received food if the actor 
pulled the level baited on the recipient’s side.  The position of the ropes alternated from 
trial to trial, so each individual had the opportunity to pull on alternate trials. The actor 
and recipient were next to each other, separated by a mesh partition (thin dotted line). 
Here, the donor is on the right side of the mesh partition, the prosocial option is provided 
on the top level and the selfish option is provided on the bottom level. 
 
Figure 2:  The distribution and conditional probability of actor’s responses given (a) 
behavior of partner on previous trial, (b) number of 1/1 choices made by partner in 
previous two trials, (c) number of 1/1 choices made by partner in previous three trials. 
The bars indicate 95% confidence intervals based on assuming independence only among 
dyads.  
 
Figure 3: The frequency of prosocial (1/1) choices over the course of the 6 sessions. The 
dashed horizontal line at 0.5 indicates chance levels of choosing the prosocial option over 
the selfish (1/0) option. Note that Y-axis scale ranges only from 45-55%. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Logistic regression analyses.  
a. Effect of partner’s behavior in last trial on actor’s behavior  
Wald χ2=5.95, p = 0.20 
 Odds ratio 95% Bounds 
Upper      Lower 
S.E. z-score P 
Partner 
Chose 
1/1 
1.01 0.85 1.20 -0.09 0.15 0.88 
Session 0.98 0.93 1.04 0.03 -0.54 0.59 
Trial 1.00 0.97 1.02 0.01 -0.43 0.67 
Baiting 2.07 0.97 4.42 0.80 1.88 0.06 
 
b. Effect of partner’s behavior in last two trials on actor’s behavior  
Wald χ2=3.91, p = 0.42 
 
 Odds ratio 95% Bounds 
Upper      Lower 
S.E. z-score P 
Partner 
Chose 
1/1 
0.099 0.79 1.26 0.12 -0.05 0.96 
Session 0.99 0.93 1.07 0.04 -0.17 0.86 
Trial 1.00 0.97 1.04 0.02 0.26 0.80 
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Baiting 2.07 0.093 4.62 0.85 1.78 0.08 
 
c. Effect of partner’s behavior in last three trials on actor’s behavior 
Wald χ2=4.50, p = 0.34 
 Odds ratio 95% Bounds 
Upper      Lower 
S.E. z-score P 
Partner 
Chose 
1/1 
0.89 0.75 1.05 0.08 -1.28 0.17 
Session 1.00 0.92 1.09 0.04 0.05 0.96 
Trial .099 0.96 1.03 0.02 -0.29 0.77 
Baiting 2.02 0.87 4.73 0.88 1.63 0.10 
 
Table 2. (a) The distribution and conditional probability of actor’s responses given 
behavior of partner on previous trial. The parentheses contain 95% confidence intervals 
based on assuming independence only among dyads.  
 Partner’s Behavior in Last Trial  
Actor’s 
Behavior 1/1 1/0 No response Total 
1/1 
195 
0.45 
(0.38-051) 
177 
0.43 
(0.33-0.52) 
67 
0.48 
(0.40-0.56) 
439 
1/0 
173 
0.40 
(0.31-0.48) 
164 
0.40 
(0.31-0.48) 
70 
0.50 
(0.41-0.59) 
407 
No response 
68 
0.16 
(0.04-0.27) 
74 
0.18 
(0.02-0.33) 
2 
0.014 
(0-0.039) 
144 
Total 436 415 139 990 
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Table 2 (b)  Multinomial regression analyses, including 1/1, 1/0, and no response as 
separate variables.  This measures the cumulative effect of partner’s behavior in last three 
trials on actor’s behavior.  Odds ratios are calculated with respect to pulling 1/0.  Results 
indicate that subjects are marginally (but not significantly) more likely to do nothing if 
they recently got food from the donor (p = 0.058, bottom table).  Baiting remains 
marginally significant. 
Wald χ2=36.82, p < 0.001 
 
Effect of pulling 1/1 (relative to 1/0) 
 Odds ratio 95% Bounds 
Upper      Lower 
S.E. z-score P 
Partner’s 
pull 
0.97 0.81 1.15 0.09 -0.37 0.071 
Session 0.097 0.089 1.07 0.0.5 -0.61 0.54 
Trial 1.01 0.097 1.05 0.02 0.047 0.064 
Baiting 2.44 0.92 6.45 1.21 1080 0.07 
 
Effect of pulling nothing (relative to 1/0) 
 Odds ratio 95% Bounds 
Upper      Lower 
S.E. z-score P 
Partner’s 
pull 
1.32 0.99 1.78 0.20 1.89 0.058 
Session 0.90 0.080 1.02 0.0.6 -1.61 0.11 
Trial 1.05 1.02 1.09 0.02 2.8 0.005 
Baiting 1.90 1.14 3.17 0.20 1.85 0.06 
 
Table 3. (a) The distribution and conditional probability of actor’s responses given (a) 
behavior of partner on previous trial, (b) number of 1/1 choices made by partner in 
previous two trials, (c) number of 1/1 choices made by partner in previous three trials. 
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The parentheses contain 95% confidence intervals based on assuming independence only 
among dyads.  
 
 Partner’s Behavior in Last Trial  
Actor’s 
Behavior 1/1 1/0 or NR Total 
1/1 
195 
0.45 
(0.38-0.51) 
244 
0.44 
(0.37-0.51) 
439 
1/0, No 
Response 
241 
0.55 
(0.51-0.60) 
310 
0.56 
(0.52-0.60) 
551 
Total 436 554 990 
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Table 3b 
 Number of 1/1 Choices by Partner in Last 2 Trials  
Actor’s 
Behavior 
0 1 2 Total 
1/1 123 
0.45 
(0.36-0.54) 
178 
0.42 
(0.35-0.50) 
76 
0.46 
(0.34-0.58) 
377 
1/0, no 
response 
149 
0.55 
(0.49-0.61) 
243 
0.58 
(0.53-0.63) 
89 
0.54 
(0.46-0.62) 
481 
Total 272 421 165 858 
 
Table 3c 
 Number of 1/1 Choices by Partner in Last 3 Trials  
Actor’s 
Behavior 
0 1 2 3 Total 
1/1 62 
0.45 
(0.35-0.56) 
132 
0.48 
(0.41-0.55) 
108 
0.42 
(0.32-0.52) 
23 
0.39 
(0.22-0.55) 
377 
1/0, no 
response 
75 
0.55 
(0.46-0.63) 
143 
0.52 
(0.46-0.58) 
147 
0.58 
(0.51-0.64) 
36 
0.61 
(0.47-0.74) 
481 
Total 137 275 255 59 858 
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Figures 
Figure 1: 
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